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VII. Evidence
J. ALEXANDER TANFORD*
A. Introduction
With rare exceptions,' Indiana evidence law progresses slowly and
holds closely to the traditional concepts of the common law. This Survey
Article collects the several important cases decided during the past year
that continue this development of Indiana's common law of evidence. 2
A general word of caution is in order concerning the Indiana appellate
courts' evidence cases. Most evidence issues arise in criminal cases, in which
convicted defendants allege error in the admission of evidence against them
or in the exclusion of evidence offered in their defense. A ruling in favor
of the defendant could result in the reversal of the conviction and the
release of the accused, something the courts seem loath to allow. Thus,
many rulings on points of evidence, particularly those where the court
disposes of the issue in a paragraph or two, should probably be inter-
preted as harmless error cases-cases in which the evidence against the
defendant is so strong that the effect of the disputed evidence is negligi-
ble. Although the court does not treat these as harmless error cases, many
seemingly contradictory opinions, upholding both trial courts that allow
the state to introduce disputed evidence and those that prevent the defend-
ant from introducing such evidence, can only be explained rationally in
this way. 3
*Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. J.D.
1976, LL.M. 1979, Duke University. Professor Tanford is one of the authors of INDIANA
TRIAL EVIDENCE MANUAL (Michie 1982).
'See, e.g., Patterson v. State, 263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d 482 (1975) (adopting unique
rule that prior statements of witnesses available for cross-examination are not hearsay);
DeVaney v. State, 259 Ind. 483, 288 N.E.2d 732 (1972) (overruling prior cases that ex-
cluded expert opinions embracing the ultimate issue); Ashton v. Anderson, 258 Ind. 51,
279 N.E.2d 210 (1972) (setting out which crimes are admissible for impeachment); Bergner
v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (one of the first cases in the country to adopt
the silent witness theory for admitting photographs as substantive evidence). See also
IND. CODE § 34-3-5-1 (1982) (news reporter's privilege); IND. CODE § 35-37-4-4 (Supp. 1983)
(shield law for rape victims).
2The reader may also wish to refer to the Survey Article on criminal law and pro-
cedure for comments on the legislature's attempt to enact a "good faith" exception to the
constitutionally mandated exclusionary rule. Johnson, Criminal Law and Procedure, 1983
Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law, 17 IND. L. REV. 115, 129 (1984). This
development is not covered in this Article.
'Compare Inman v. State, 270 Ind. 130, 383 N.E.2d 820 (1978) (finding that objec-
tions to defendant's cross-examinaton question concerning prior inconsistent statement were
properly sustained because the question called for conclusion), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 855
(1979) with Cichos v. State, 246 Ind. 680, 208 N.E.2d 685 (upholding proof of a prior
inconsistent statement by State on grounds that anything inconsistent or contradictory casts
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B. Hearsay
1. Continuing Development of the Patterson Rule.-In the 1975 case
of Patterson v. State,4 the Indiana Supreme Court announced that the
prior out-of-court statements of witnesses available for cross-examination
were no longer to be considered hearsay. If a witness is present and
available for cross-examination, then his or her prior statements are ad-
missible for the truth of their contents. The prior statements need not
be sworn or inconsistent with the witness' trial testimony.' Either litigant
may take advantage of the Patterson rule. The cross-examiner may in-
troduce prior inconsistent statements to impeach and contradict witnesses
who testify against him.' However, a more litigated application of the
Patterson rule has been the direct examiner's use of prior consistent
statements to corroborate a witness' direct testimony. In the past year,
Indiana courts have addressed three previously unsettled issues concerning
the use of prior consistent statements as part of direct examination: (a)
whether an available declarant must actually give direct testimony; (b)
if so, how complete the testimony must be; and (c) if the witness-declarant
does give extensive direct testimony, whether a cumulative prior statement
that merely reiterates the direct testimony is admissible.
In Lewis v. State,' the Indiana Supreme Court settled the first of
these issues-whether prior statements are admissible if the declarant is
made available for cross-examination but is not actually called to testify.
The court held that the central requirement for the admissibility of prior
consistent statements is that the witness-declarant must give direct testimony
about the events related in the statement:'
doubt on witness's veracity), reh'g denied, 246 Ind. 680, 210 N.E.2d 363 (1965), appeal
dismissed, 385 U.S. 76 (1966), reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 1020 (1967). Compare Shelby v. State,
428 N.E.2d 1241 (Ind. 1981) (defense witness prevented from stating opinion about defend-
ant's state of mind) with Porter v. State, 271 Ind. 180, 391 N.E.2d 801 (1979) (prosecu-
tion witness allowed to give opinion on defendant's state of mind). Compare Ingram v.
State, 426 N.E.2d 18 (Ind. 1981) (excluding defendant's cross-examination questions as beyond
scope of direct) with Doty v. State, 422 N.E.2d 653 (Ind. 1981) (allowing state to ask ques-
tions that were arguably beyond scope of direct). See also Carter v. State, 412 N.E.2d 825,
830-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (concluding that seemingly inconsistent supreme court cases were
really harmless error cases and that the supreme court had not intended to announce a
change in an evidentiary rule).
'263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d 482 (1975).
'Cf. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(l)(A) (prior statement considered nonhearsay only if in-
consistent and made under oath).
'This part of the rule has never presented any real problem in application. The only
issue in this situation is whether the full foundation for prior inconsistent statements must
be laid. See Cichos v. State, 246 Ind. 680, 208 N.E.2d 685 (requiring confrontation of
witness with circumstances and details of prior inconsistent statement), reh'g denied, 246
Ind. 680, 210 N.E. 2d 363 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 76 (1966), reh'g denied, 385
U.S. 1020 (1967). This question has not been addressed by the Indiana Supreme Court.
Cf. D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 295 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (requiring confrontation).
'440 N.E.2d 1125 (Ind. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1895 (1983).
'Id. at 1130.
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[T]he key question in determining whether or not an abuse of
the Patterson rule has occurred is whether the State has submit-
ted evidence as to the relevant factual events in the case by directly
examining (and thereby making him available for cross-
examination) the witness-declarant about those facts. What we will
not permit is for the State to put in substantive evidence of the
witness-declarant's version of the facts solely through the admis-
sion of the witness' prior statement under the pretext of the Pat-
terson rule. At some point the State must put the declarant of
the prior statement on the witness stand and elicit direct testimony
as to the facts at issue.
In so holding, the court cited language from earlier cases stating that the
Patterson rule was not intended to allow a party to use out-of-court
statements as a substitute for available in-court testimony.'" Although the
court did not discuss any of the cases to the contrary, the opinion can
be read as overruling Dowdell v. State" and Little v. State'2 sub silentio;
cases in which prior statements were admitted despite the fact that the
witness-declarants were not called to the witness stand.
A more difficult issue is the precise extent of direct testimony that
must be elicited. Taken literally, Lewis seems to stand for the proposition
that the witness must provide direct testimony as to all of the relevant
events in order for his or her prior statements to be admissible. This is
the interpretation given Lewis by the first district court of appeals in
B.M.P. v. State.'3 In B.M.P., the State introduced the declarant's prior
statement under the Patterson rule before the declarant was called as a
witness. Later in the trial, the State called the declarant, who testified
to some general matters but refused to testify about the robbery in issue.
The defendant did not claim any fifth amendment privilege; he simply
refused to testify. He was found guilty of contempt and returned to prison.
The court of appeals relied on the literal language of Lewis and held that
if a declarant refused to testify about relevant facts, whether or not on
9Id.
"The court cited Stone v. State, 268 Ind. 672, 678, 377 N.E.2d 1372, 1375 (1978)
("the use of prior statements . . . by the proponent of the witness in lieu of available
and direct testimony . . . will no longer be sanctioned"); Samuels v. State, 267 Ind. 676,
679, 372 N.E.2d 1186, 1187 (1978) (using out-of-court statements "as a mere substitute
for available in-court testimony" is a misapplication of Patterson rule); Flewallen v. State,
267 Ind. 90, 98, 368 N.E.2d 239, 243 (1977) (DeBruler, J., dissenting) (rule should not
permit the state to prove its case solely through the use of prior statements, without even
attempting to elicit the live testimony of sworn witnesses). See also C. MCCORMICK, HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 251, at 601, 603 (2d ed. 1972) (offering statement
in lieu of live testimony, merely tendering the witness for cross-examination, seen as serious
danger).
''429 N.E.2d I (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), criticized in Karlson, Evidence, 1982 Survey
of Recent Developments in Indiana Law, 16 IND. L. REV. 191, 191-93 (1982).
2413 N.E. 2d 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
"446 N.E.2d 17 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
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fifth amendment grounds, his prior statements could not be admitted
because there had been no direct testimony about the facts in issue."
It is doubtful that this is the result intended by the Indiana Supreme
Court. To reach this result, the court of appeals had to surmise that Lewis
overruled, or at least weakened, another supreme court decision, Rapier
v. State,'5 decided only five months earlier. In Rapier, a state's witness
gave some direct testimony but refused to testify about the event itself,
asserting an invalid fifth amendment privilege. The State then offered in-
to evidence the witness' prior statement about the robbery in question.
Despite the fact that the refusal to testify made cross-examination prac-
tically impossible, the supreme court held the statement admissible under
Patterson." The position taken by the court in Rapier was consistent with
a series of cases in which the prior statements of witnesses had been found
admissible despite the fact that adequate cross-examination of the
declarants had been difficult or impossible because they claimed a lack
of memory,' 7 lack of personal knowledge,' 8 or the fifth amendment
privilege.' 9 A few months later when it decided Lewis, the court gave
no indication that it intended to retreat from this holding.
Rapier and Lewis can be reconciled, however, and some guidance
can be derived for determining when a prior statement may be used as
a substitute for direct examination. The basic foundation requirement
stated in Lewis is that the offering party must first call the declarant as
a witness and attempt to elicit the relevant facts through direct
examination."0 No prior statements are admissible until after this attempt
has been made. However, pursuant to Rapier, if the witness refuses to
testify or claims a lack of memory, the prior statement is admissible despite
the difficulty in cross-examining the witness. The Patterson rule only pro-
hibits the use of out-of-court statements in lieu of available direct
testimony, 2' and if a witness refuses to testify, his or her direct testimony
becomes unavailable.
"Id. at 20.
'1435 N.E.2d 31, 33-35 (Ind. 1982). The court in B.M.P. stated that "Lewis appears
to be a retreat from the position stated in Rapier." 446 N.E.2d at 20.
'1435 N.E.2d at 35.
"See Lowery v. State, 434 N.E.2d 868, 870 (Ind. 1982); Arch v. State, 269 Ind. 450,
454, 381 N.E.2d 465, 468 (1978).
"See Balfour v. State, 427 N.E.2d 1091 (Ind. 1981).
"See Torrence v. State, 263 Ind. 202, 205, 328 N.E.2d 214, 216 (1975). But see Tag-
gart v. State, 269 Ind. 667, 671, 382 N.E.2d 916, 919 (1978) (DeBruler, J., concurring) (arguing
that successfully asserting fifth amendment prevents cross-examination and makes prior
statements inadmissible hearsay). Interestingly, DeBruler also wrote the majority opinion
in Torrence.
"But cf. Remsen v. State, 428 N.E.2d 241 (Ind. 1981) (holding that it is permissible
to introduce the statement first and call the witness-declarant later for full examination).
"In Patterson, the court emphasized that "the availability of the declarant for cross-
examination is required. It is our judgment that this safe-guard is of paramount importance
... " 263 Ind. at 58, 324 N.E.2d at 485 (emphasis added).
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The Indiana Supreme Court's approach is troublesome. As long as
the witness-declarant testifies and can be cross-examined fully about both
the veracity of the prior statement and the credibility of his or her under-
lying observations, application of the Patterson rule is clearly correct
because none of the usual hearsay dangers are present. However, when
statements are admitted in the absence of an adequate opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant because he or she refuses to testify or is unable
to recall the events, then the hearsay dangers return. The opponent can-
not interrogate the declarant and challenge the veracity of the statement
if the declarant will not or cannot discuss it in court. To call such a state-
ment admissible nonhearsay under the Patterson rule is to change the basic
concept of hearsay: that an inability to test the veracity of the declarant
requires that a statement be excluded unless it falls within an established
exception to the hearsay rule.22 Moreover, the Patterson rule is premised
on having an available witness-declarant and when a witness-declarant can-
not remember the facts or refuses to testify about them, the witness is
unavailable for all practical purposes.
An analysis more true to the hearsay rule would be the approach
suggested by Justices DeBruler and Prentice and by the first district court
of appeals in B.M.P: if the declarant cannot be cross-examined effec-
tively, his or her prior statements do not fall within the Patterson rule,
and should be considered hearsay.23 This does not mean that the statements
necessarily are inadmissible. The modern trend is to recognize that in-
ability to remember or refusal to testify constitutes unavailability for pur-
poses of the hearsay exceptions for declarations against interest and former
testimony.2" If the proponent can lay the foundation for either exception,
the statement would be admissible. This approach would better assure
that unreliable hearsay is excluded and that reliable statements are admit-
ted by requiring either that the declarant be subject to cross-examination
or that the statement meet the reliability criteria of the traditional hear-
say exceptions.2
221n Patterson, the court stated: "[Tihe primary reason for excluding hearsay is because
of its insusceptibility to the test of cross-examination." 263 Ind. at 57, 324 N.E.2d at 484
(citation omitted). See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 245, at 583-84; M. SEIDMAN, The
Law of Evidence in Indiana 113-15 (1977); J. TANFORD & R. QUINLAN, INDIANA TRIAL
EVIDENCE MANUAL § 16.1 (1982).
23Taggart v. State, 269 Ind. 667, 671-72, 382 N.E.2d 916, 919 (1978) (DeBruler, J.
and Prentice, I., concurring); B.M.P. v. State, 446 N.E.2d 17, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
'4See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(l)-(3); see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 253 at
611-12,2 5Many statements about which a declarant will refuse to testify, or will develop sudden
"amnesia," will be statements against his or her penal interest. Although the Indiana
Supreme Court has explicitly refused to recognize declarations against penal interest as a
hearsay exception, Taggart v. State, 269 Ind. 667, 382 N.E.2d 916 (1978), many jurisdic-
tions now allow such statements into evidence. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). The In-
diana Supreme Court's concern that an accused would present perjured third-party confes-
sions under this exception probably is an exaggerated fear. First, such statements currently
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At the opposite end of the spectrum is the situation in which a
witness-declarant provides full and complete testimony on direct examina-
tion, showing a clear memory of the events, and the examiner seeks to
introduce his or her prior statements that reiterate the direct but raise
no new matters. Such cumulative evidence should be excluded on relevancy
grounds as any purely repetitious testimony would be. 6 This objection
was raised in Lewis but rejected by the supreme court, although that
opinion disposes of this issue with no real discussion:
Appellant claims the trial court erred in admitting over his objec-
tion hearsay testimony. This testimony was elicited from [three]
State's witnesses . . . [who] testified as to statements made to
them by [the victim] both before and after the offense was com-
mitted. The subject matter of these statements had already been
addressed by [the victim] in the direct and cross-examination.
Appellant now concludes . . . that abuse of the Patterson rule
are admissible under Patterson if the defendant calls that third party as a witness, even
if he or she asserts the fifth amendment. See Torrence v. State, 263 Ind. 202, 205, 328
N.E.2d 214, 216 (1975). Second, a penal interest exception could be modeled after the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which require that a third-party confession offered to exculpate the defend-
ant is only admissible if "corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness
of the statement." FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). See also 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 1477, at 358 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). Wigmore states that the fear of
perjury
is the ancient rusty weapon that has always been brandished to oppose any reform
in the rules of evidence .... This would be a good argument against admitting
any witnesses at all, for it is notorious that some witnesses will lie and that it
is difficult to avoid being deceived by their lies. The truth is that any rule which
hampers an honest man in exonerating himself is a bad rule, even if it also hampers
a villain in falsely passing for an innocent.
The only practical consequences of [excluding declarations against penal in-
terest] are shocking to the sense of justice; for in its commonest application it
requires . . . the rejection of a confession, however well authenticated, of a per-
son . . . who has avowed himself to be the true culprit.
Id. at 358-59. Third, it has been suggested that restricting a defendant's ability to prove
reliable third-party confessions violates his or her sixth amendment right to present exculpatory
evidence. See Tague, Perils of Rulemaking Process: The Development, Application, and
Unconstitutionality of Rule 804(b)(3)'s Penal Interest Exception, 69 GEO. L.J. 851 (1981).
Adoption of the penal interest exception by Indiana would not greatly affect ultimate ad-
missibility, but would bring a measure of rationality to this area.
"See, e.g., Palmer v. State, 153 Ind. App. 648, 288 N.E.2d 739 (1972) (proper for
trial court to prevent witness from repeating testimony already covered once); Hawkins v.
State, 219 Ind. 116, 37 N.E.2d 79 (1941) (within court's discretion to stop repetitious ques-
tioning). See generally T. SMrrH, TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR INDIANA LAWYERS § 231, at 181-82
(1982); J. TANFORD & R. QtnNLAN, supra note 22, §§ 3.1 - 3.4, at 5-6; Brasswell, Objections-
Howls of a Dog Pound Quarrel, 4 CAMPBELL L. REV. 339, 357-58 (1982); Denbeaux &
Risinger, Questioning Questions: Objections to Form in the Interrogation of Witnesses, 33
ARK. L. REV. 439, 486-87 (1979); Karlson, supra note i, at 193-94.
[Vol. 17:197
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occurs when it is used to . . . permit a retelling of her story
through the admission of other witness testimony as to her prior
statements concerning the facts at issue.
Appellent is not correct ....
We hold there was not improper application of the Patterson
rule here. . . . [T]he Patterson rule was not used to admit substan-
tive evidence "in lieu of available and direct testimony . . .-.
Earlier Patterson rule cases had contained language strongly suggesting
that purely cumulative prior statements, although not hearsay, might be
excludable. 8 Unfortunately, the supreme court has never given an explicit
answer to this question. Although Lewis appears to permit purely
cumulative statements, the language used by the court is hardly definite
enough to say that the matter is settled. Indeed, in light of the fact that
the cases prior to Lewis seemed to imply the opposite result, it is not
at all clear that the court in Lewis intended to open the door to the
repetitious use of prior statements.29 On this point, Lewis probably should
be read as a harmless error case."
2. Tacit Admissions.-It has long been the rule that the failure to
deny an accusation can constitute a tacit admission that the accusation
is true. The proponent of a tacit admission must demonstrate that the
accusation was made in the presence of the accused person, that the ac-
cused heard and understood the accusation and had a realistic opportunity
to deny it, and that the statement would ordinarily be denied by an inno-
cent person. If this foundation is laid, then anything other than a clear
denial may be allowed as evidence that the accused tacitly acknowledged
the truth of the accusation. 3' Before 1982, tacit admissions were only ad-
11440 N.E.2d at 1129-30 (quoting Stone v. State, 268 Ind. 672, 678, 377 N.E.2d 1372,
1375 (1978) (emphasis added)).
"See, Norton v. State, 408 N.E.2d 514, 522-23 (Ind. 1980) (consistent statement in-
troduced on redirect was relevant for clarification after testimony became confused on cross-
examination); Flewallen v. State, 267 Ind. 90, 368 N.E.2d 239 (1977) (statements were con-
sistent with testimony but were relevant because more detailed and more incriminating);
Patterson v. State, 263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d 482 (1975) (statement was more incriminating
and more revealing than testimony). But see Underhill v. State, 428 N.E.2d 759, 765-66
(Ind. 1981) (refusing to reverse because contents of statement "merely reiterated" the direct
testimony; probably a harmless error case); Buttram v. State, 269 Ind. 598, 382 N.E.2d
166 (1978) (permitting other witnesses to repeat statements by victim; no discussion).
"The policy argument against allowing cumulative prior statements is simple. Because
the rules of evidence generally will not permit a witness to tell his or her story once and
then simply to start over at the beginning and tell it again, a few witnesses should not
be allowed to do exactly the same thing merely because they happen to have made prior
statements. The consequences might be that eventually, every attorney may have his or her
witnesses prepare written statements before trial so they could "testify" twice.
"See supra text accompanying note 3.
"See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 270, at 651-55. But cf. Gamble,
The Tacit Admission Rule: Unreliable and Unconstitutional-A Doctrine Ripe for Aban-
donment, 14 GA. L. REV. 27 (1979).
19841
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missible when the accused person was a party-opponent so that the im-
plied statement fell within the hearsay exception for admissions by the
opposing party.32 In Moredock v. State," the Indiana Supreme Court com-
bined the concept of tacit admissions with the Patterson rule to create
a new rule of evidence: the prior tacit admissions of nonparty witnesses
who are present and available for cross-examination are admissible
nonhearsay to the same extent as their other prior statements. Moredock
was convicted of rape and based his application for a new trial on newly
discovered evidence, including evidence that the victim tacitly admitted
that no rape occurred.3 ' The supreme court remanded the case for a
new trial, holding that the victim's tacit admission could "properly be
considered by the jury as substantive evidence" on retrial.33
Moredock is a new extension of Indiana's unique hearsay rule which
has developed since Patterson. Tacit admissions of parties traditionally
have been admissible because the party-"declarant" is usually present and
can explain why he or she failed to deny the acusation.36 The extension
of the Patterson rule to tacit admissions in Moredock still ensures that
the accused person will be present at trial to explain any mitigating cir-
cumstances or misunderstandings surrounding a tacit admission. Under
the Patterson rule only the prior statements of witnesses who are available
for cross-examination are admissible non-hearsay. Therefore, under
Moredock, only the tacit admissions of available non-party witnesses will
be allowed. It is unlikely that this doctrine will be extended to other kinds
of admissible hearsay because the absence of a declarant makes it im-
possible to verify that he or she truly heard, understood, and acquiesced
in another's assertion of wrongdoing.37
3. Business Records.-Under the business records execption to the
hearsay rule, a foundation for the admission of business records is laid
by calling a witness to authenticate them. Indiana courts traditionally have
"See J. TANFORD & R. QUINLAN, supra note 22, § 17.5, at 86-87, and cases cited
therein. For example, in Robinson v. State, 262 Ind. 463, 317 N.E.2d 850 (1974), a witness
testified that he heard the defendant's mother say, "You shouldn't have thrown the baby
against the wall," and the defendant respond, "Shut up." Id. at 465, 317 N.E.2d at 852.
"441 N.E.2d 1372 (Ind. 1982).
"The opinion does not indicate the exact nature of the accusation, the nature of the
victim's response, or the circumstances, other than that the witness who allegedly heard
the tacit admission went to see the victim immediately after the incident. The court's discus-
sion of the effect of an equivocal response and the absence of a clear denial, id. at 1374,
indicates that the victim may have failed to deny the witness' assertion that the rape charge
was fabricated to force the victim's boyfriend to move out.
351d.
"See M. SEIDMAN, supra note 22, at 118-23; J. TANFORD & R. QUINLAN, supra note
22, §§ 17.1, 17.5, at 85, 85-86.
"See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 270, at 652 (courts receive tacit ad-
missions with caution because it is easy to manufacture this kind of evidence, and it may
be extremely damaging to the defendant).
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required that either the person who made the entry or the entrant's direct
supervisor identify the document. 8 Although Indiana courts reiterated this
rule in two decisions during the survey period,39 the supreme court's deci-
sion in Pitts v. State"0 appears to contravene these long-established re-
quirements for laying a proper business record foundation.
In Pitts, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's admission of
fingerprint cards prepared by various state prison officials4 after authen-
tication by a federal agent, an FBI fingerprint specialist, as business records
of the FBI . 4 The supreme court conceded that the authenticating witness
was not the actual entrant; therefore, the only other accepted method of
laying a business records foundation was to call someone under whose
supervision the entries were made. The witness called in Pitts, however,
was not the supervisor of the state officials who prepared the entry. As
far as the trial record shows, he was not even a supervisor of the FBI.
Nor were the state prison officials who made the entries employees or
agents of the FBI.
At first glance Pitts appears to represent a major shift in Indiana
law regarding the admissibility of business records, overruling the series
of recent cases requiring that the entrant or his supervisor identify the
records43 and that the entries be prepared by an employee of the business
that maintains the record." It is highly unlikely, however, that the supreme
"See J. TANFORD & R. QUINLAN, supra note 22, § 19.3, at 95-96.
"Darnell v. State, 435 N.E.2d 250, 253 (Ind. 1982) (person in charge of record keep-
ing may authenticate business records prepared by other employees); Hebel v. Conrail, Inc.,
444 N.E.2d 870, 877-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) ("custodian of business records may identify
them at trial"; "person making the record must be under direct supervision and control
of the supervisor identifying the documents"). The basic rule is repeated in the text only
because some confusion seems to exist in the secondary literature over who can be called
as the authenticating witness. See M. SEIOMAN, supra note 22, at 135 (records may be authen-
ticated by any witness having knowledge of the recordkeeping process; no citations).
"0439 N.E.2d 1140 (Ind. 1982).
"The opinion does not state where the fingerprint cards originated. This information
was obtained from R. Robinson, the defense attorney, by telephone on June 8, 1983.
"1439 N.E.2d at 1142.
"See Morris v. State, 406 N.E.2d 1187 (Ind. 1980); Brandon v. State, 396 N.E.2d
365 (Ind. 1979); Crosson v. State, 268 Ind. 511, 376 N.E.2d 1136 (1978); Jones v. State
267 Ind. 205, 369 N.E.2d 418 (1977); Burger Man, Inc. v. Jordan Paper Prod., Inc., 170
Ind. App. 295, 352 N.E.2d 821 (1976); American United Life Ins. Co. v. Peffley, 158 Ind.
App. 29, 301 N.E.2d 651 (1973). But cf. Myers v. State, 422 N.E.2d 745 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981) (identifying witness was not supervisor). While many of these cases require the super-
visor under whose direction the records are "kept," this phrase means more than mere
mechanical storage of records. The very heart of the business records exception is that
documents must be records both prepared and maintained by a business in the course of
regularly conducted activities. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 310, at 725-27.
"Morris v. State, 406 N.E.2d 1187 (Ind. 1980); Brandon v. State, 396 N.E.2d 365
(Ind. 1979); Crosson v. State, 268 Ind. 511, 376 N.E.2d 1136 (1978); Jones v. State, 267
Ind. 205, 369 N.E.2d 418 (1977); Wells v. State, 254 Ind. 608, 261 N.E.2d 865 (1970);
American United Life Ins. Co. v. Peffley, 158 Ind. App. 29, 301 N.E.2d 651 (1973). Many
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court intended to allow records prepared by one business to be admissi-
ble as the business records of a different business. From the perfunctory
opinion in Pitts, it appears that this issue was not raised by the defense
attorney, and that the supreme court only intended to dispose of the
meritless argument that the records should be excluded because their spon-
sor lacked personal knowledge. Although the result sanctioned is incom-
patible with prior law, it is doubtful that the supreme court intended a
major change away from the common law in a sparse opinion which is
nearly devoid of discussion and that cites only one prior case."
4. Excited Utterances.-To qualify under the excited utterance ex-
ception to the hearsay rule, a declaration must be made in spontaneous
response to a startling event. The event must be exciting enough to over-
come the reflective faculties of the declarant, and the statement must be
made sufficiently contemporaneous with the event, before the excitement
wears off, so that there is not time for calm reflection. 6 No fixed time
limit has been set by the courts, but the more time that has elapsed be-
tween the event and the making of the statement, the less likely it is to
qualify as an excited utterance. Prior Indiana decisions have uniformly
held that statements made more than a few minutes after a startling event
do not qualify. 7 Indeed, the longest interval allowed before 1982 was
fifteen minutes. 8
During the survey period, however, this time limit was extended
significantly. In Gye v. State, 9 the supreme court affirmed the trial court's
admission of a statement as an excited utterance when the statement was
made approximately forty-five minutes after the startling event. In this
case, the person making the statement was the victim of a stabbing. The
victim stopped a car soon after she was attacked and was driven to the
hospital. The trip took about forty minutes. At the hospital, the emergency
of these cases state that the entrant must have a duty to record information. This phrase
does not mean just any duty, but a business duty owed by an employee to his or her employer.
See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 310, at 726-27.
'See supra text accompanying note 3.
46J. TANFORD & R. QUINLAN, supra note 22, § 28.3, at 135-36. Additional foundation
requirements include: (I) the declarant was a participant in or an observer of the event;
(2) the declaration related to the exciting event, explaining or elucidating it; (3) the declara-
tion was a statement of fact, not opinion; and (4) the statement was made voluntarily.
Id. (citations omitted).
'See Reburn v. State, 421 N.E.2d 604 (Ind. 1981) (three hours); Ketcham v. State,
240 Ind. 107, 162 N.E.2d 247 (1959) (two hours); Pittsburgh, C. & S.L. Ry. v. Wright,
80 Ind. 182 (1881) (thirty minutes); State v. Dutton, 405 N.E.2d 560 (Ind. App. 1980) (ten
minutes); Cauldwell, Inc. v. Patterson, 133 Ind. App. 138, 177 N.E.2d 490 (1961) (one hour).
"Block v. State, 265 Ind. 569, 356 N.E.2d 683 (1976) (rape victim drove fifteen
minutes to sister's home and immediately made statement). Cf. Choctaw v. State, 270 Ind.
545, 387 N.E.2d 1305 (1979) (court admitted as an excited utterance a statement made by
a rape victim to the first police officer to arrive at her home, stating that the declaration
was made within an hour of the attack, without being more specific about exactly how
much time had elapsed).
4'441 N.E.2d 436 (Ind. 1982).
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room physician asked her what happened, and she told him she had been
in a fight with her husband. The court ruled that despite the lapse of
time and the fact that it was made in response to questions, her state-
ment qualified as an excited utterance: 0
The length of elapsed time between when the declarations were
uttered and when the occurrence took place is only one element
to be considered in determining their spontaneity. Similarly, that
the statements were made in response to inquiries is also only
one factor to be considered.
. . . [Decedent's] condition rapidly deteriorated at the hospital
and decedent constantly asked if she were going to die. The facts
and circumstances demonstrate that the excitement from decedent's
injuries and attendant pain, continued and controlled her thoughts
and actions from the moment that the wounds were inflicted until
she expired. Whether a statement is to be admitted as an excited
utterance is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge and
here we find no abuse of that discretion."
The ruling in Gye appears to bring Indiana into line with other
jurisdictions that follow the modern trend regarding excited utterances.2
This hearsay exception has evolved from permitting only spontaneous ex-
clamations made contemporaneously with the startling event, to include
all utterances made while in an excited state of mind. Older cases re-
ferred to the exception as "res gestae" or "spontaneous exclamations," and
tended to require literal spontaneity; only declarations made contem-
poraneous with or immediately after a startling event were admitted under
the exception. 3 The modern trend, exemplified by the Federal Rules of
Evidence,5" is to call the exception "excited utterances," and shift the
focus of the inquiry from spontaneity to whether the statement was made
while the declarant was still under the stress and excitement of the event,
regardless of the time that has elapsed. In other jurisdictions, statements
made as long as fourteen hours after the startling event have been held
to qualify as excited utterances if there is evidence the declarant was still
in an excited mental state." It is probable, however, that as the elapsed
111d. at 438.
'Id. (citations omitted).
"Although the language of the opinion indicates that the court has shifted its focus,
the court also stated that any error in admitting the statement the victim made to the doc-
tor was harmless because the statement was only cumulative of other evidence.
"See, e.g., Daywitt v. Daywitt, 63 Ind. App. 444, 114 N.E. 694 (1917).
"See FED. R. EvID. 803(2) (statements made while "under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition").
"See State v. Stafford, 237 Iowa 780, 23 N.W.2d 832 (1946); see also United States
v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980) (statement by a child one hour after assault ad-
missible); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979) (statement by child a few
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time between the event and the declaration increases, stronger evidence
will be needed to prove that the declarant was still in a state of excitement.
C. Evidence of Prior Criminal Activity
Evidence that a criminal defendant has committed crimes other than
the one charged generally is not admissible. 6 Once a jury hears that a
defendant has a criminal record, especially if the defendant has been con-
victed for similar crimes, it is more likely to convict him or her. 7 In-
diana courts have long recognized that there is an automatic unfavorable
reaction in a juror's mind upon discovering that the defendant has a prior
record, which makes such evidence presumptively inadmissible because of
its highly prejudicial effect.58 Neverthless, if evidence of prior criminal
activity has some substantial probative value on an issue other than the
defendant's general criminality, it may be admissible. This general excep-
tion is applied in many common situations. Evidence of other crimes may
be admissible to show knowledge, intent, or malice, to impeach credibility,
to establish motive when one crime is committed to cover an earlier crime,
or to prove the identity of the defendant." One common use of such
evidence is to prove the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of
the crime by establishing a common scheme or plan.6"
The exception to the rule that evidence of prior criminal activity is
not admissible may be the most misunderstood doctrine of evidence. Too
often, the inquiry into admissibility begins and ends with the attaching
of a convenient label. There is a tendency on the part of courts and at-
hours after assault admissible); Wallace v. State, 151 Ga. App. 171, 259 S.E.2d 172
(1979) (statements one to two hours after the event admissible).
"E.g., Malone v. State, 441 N.E.2d 1339, 1345-46 (Ind. 1982); Watts v. State, 229
Ind. 80, 102-04, 95 N.E.2d 570, 579-80 (1950).
"See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 160 (1966). In an informal ex-
periment conducted by the author of this Survey Article, students in evidence classes at
Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington were asked to decide the guilt or innocence
of a defendant based on a summary of the evidence for and against him. With all other
facts being identical, the conviction rate jumped from 15% to 45% when students were
told that the defendant had a prior record of similar criminal activity.
"See, e.g., Malone v. State, 441 N.E.2d 1339, 1345-46 (Ind. 1982); Blue v. State,
250 Ind. 249, 235 N.E.2d 471 (1968); Vaughn v. State, 215 Ind. 142, 19 N.E.2d 239 (1939).
"See J. TANFORD & R. QUINLAN, supra note 22, § 44.7, at 220-21 and cases cited therein.
"The Indiana Supreme Court discussed the reason for allowing the use of evidence
of prior criminal activity to show a common plan or scheme in Malone v. State, 441 N.E.2d
1339 (Ind. 1982):
The operative rationale is that if an accused is known to have committed a crime
in a particularly distinctive way, then that accused can probatively be considered
as having committed another similar crime if the similar crime was also commit-
ted in the same particularly distinct way .... [T]his Court requires a strong showing
that the different criminal actions were so similarly conducted that the method
of conduct can be considered akin to the accused's "signature."
Id. at 1346.
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torneys to assume that evidence of other crimes is automatically admissi-
ble once it has been characterized as evidence of a common scheme or
plan, identification, intent, and so forth.6 ' The failure to rigorously analyze
the underlying relevancy of the evidence often leads to the admission of
evidence of prior criminal activity on issues that are not actually con-
tested. This amounts to allowing evidence with very low probative value
despite its highly prejudicial effect.
The proper balancing of the probative value of evidence of prior
criminal activity against its prejudicial effect was illustrated by a series
of cases decided during the survey period. The most thorough discussion
of the problem is found in Malone v. State.62 Malone was charged with
rape but claimed that the victim consented. The State offered evidence
that Malone had raped another woman six weeks after the incident that
was the basis of the charge in this case. The supreme court reversed
Malone's conviction on the ground that evidence of the other rape had
little probative value and was highly prejudicial. 3 The court stated:
To indiscriminately admit proof of criminal activity beyond that
specifically charged may compel a defendant to meet accusations
without notice and may effectively negate the due process and
presumption of innocence which our system of justice accords to
every accused. Moreover, the admissibility of such evidence may
raise collateral issues which confuse the jury or divert its atten-
tion from the actual charges before it."
The court noted that there are exceptions such as the use of such evidence
to prove intent, motive, or common scheme or plan. However, pigeonhol-
ing the evidence into one of those categories does not make it automatically
admissible. The court explained:
To be admissible according to any one of these exceptions,
however, the evidence must possess substantial probative value
[and be so] specifically and significantly related to the charged
crime in time, place and circumstance as to be logically relevant
to one of the particular excepted purposes."
6 See, e.g., Karlson, supra note 11, at 196-99 (evidence of common scheme allowed
to prove that defendant is a professional criminal without any showing of particular relevancy).
62441 N.E.2d 1339 (Ind. 1982).
631d. at 1348.
"4d. at 1346 (citations omitted).6 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court used common scheme or plan
as an illustration:
For instance, evidence of other criminal activity is commonly allowed to prove
the identification of an accused according to the common scheme or plan excep-
tion .... Notwithstanding, if the identification of an accused can be proved by
other evidence or if an accused's identity is not a material issue, then the admis-
sion of evidence of other criminal activity is improper to establish identity.
Id. (citations omitted).
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The court held because the only real issue in Malone was the victim's
consent-the defendant admitted the sexual intercourse-there was no
material issue on which the evidence of the prior rape could be admitted.
The court noted that "[t]he fact that one woman was raped has no
tendency to prove that another woman did not consent." 66
The requirement that evidence of other crimes have particular relevancy
before it is admissible can be further illustrated by comparing two recent
cases involving the admissibility of "mug shot" photographs of the defend-
ant. In Miller v. State,6 7 the supreme court reversed a rape conviction
because the State was allowed to introduce mug shot photographs that
suggested the defendant had a prior criminal record. In Smith v. State,8
the court affirmed a conviction despite the State's use of mug shot
photographs. The difference in result is explained by the fact that in Smith
the mug shots had particular relevancy on a contested issue, while in Miller
they did not.
In Smith, the defendant asserted an alibi defense and questioned the
victim's opportunity to observe, and subsequently identify, his assailant.
Under those circumstances, the court held that it was proper for the State
to introduce the mug shot and prove the victim had been able to identify
the photograph in a photo array "to rebut the defendant's challenge to
the reliability of the victim's in-court identification." 9 The identity of
the assailant was a central, material issue, and the victim's ability to iden-
tify the mug shot was of particular relevancy. In Miller, the rape victim
identified her assailant by selecting a mug shot photograph of the defend-
ant from a photo array. The photograph was subsequently introduced
at trial on the issue of identity. In contrast to Smith, however, the defend-
ant's identity was admitted in the opening statement and the only genuinely
contested issue was consent. Therefore, the court found that the photo-
graph had no evidentiary value because identification was not a contested
issue . 71
The supreme court's decision in Jackson v. State7 also demonstrated
that evidence of prior criminal activity is admissible if particularly rele-
vant to a contested issue. In Jackson, the State alleged that the defendant
robbed and shot a cab driver, and that his accomplice drove a getaway
car. The defendant claimed he drove the car and the accomplice pulled
the trigger. Thus, the identity of the shooter was in issue." The trial court
"1d. at 1347.
07436 N.E.2d 1113 (Ind. 1982).
08445 N.E.2d 85 (Ind. 1983).
"Id. at 87 (citation omitted).
10436 N.E.2d at 1120.
"446 N.E.2d 344 (Ind. 1983).
"Arguably, because the accomplice was equally guilty of murder as an accessory, id.
at 346 (citations omitted), it made no legal difference who actually pulled the trigger. Never-
theless, because the question could have affected the jury's willingness to find the defend-
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allowed the State to introduce evidence of a similar crime committed by
the defendant to prove that the defendant was the shooter in the instant
case. In the prior crime, the victim positively identified the defendant
as the shooter, and the defendant admitted that he, not the accomplice,
pulled the trigger. The supreme court, after lengthy analysis, found the two
crimes "sufficiently similar to constitute Appellant's criminal 'signature' ".11
Therefore, evidence of the other crime was admissible to show a common
scheme or plan because it was relevant to a contested issue. Although
the court did not articulate its reasons for finding relevancy, they are
clear from the nature of the case; the prior crime was relevant evidence
on the contested issue of whether the defendant shot the cab driver in
the second crime.
D. Expert Testimony- "Reasonable Medical Certainty"
In Noblesville Casting Division of TRW v. Prince,75 the Indiana
Supreme Court held that medical experts are not restricted to giving opin-
ions that can be stated with reasonable medical certainty.7" The justices
ant guilty and easily could have affected sentencing, the question of the identity of the
shooter was a legitimate material issue.
"Id. at 347.
1"See generally J. TANFORD & R. QUINLAN, supra note 22, § 44.7, at 220-21 (to use
common scheme or plan to prove identity, the other crimes must be similar, the manner
of committing them must be so distinctive as to constitute a "signature," and the evidence
must positively connect the defendant to the other crime). See also C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 10, § 190, at 448-49.
Given this consistent requirement that evidence of prior crimes is only admissible if it
has some specific relevancy, the courts' approach in "drug peddling" cases, such as Downer
v. State, 429 N.E.2d 953 (Ind. 1982), is troublesome. See also Manuel v. State, 267 Ind.
436, 370 N.E.2d 904 (1977); Ingle v. State, 176 Ind. App. 695, 377 N.E.2d 885 (1978);
Miller v. State, 167 Ind. App. 271, 338 N.E.2d 733 (1975). In Downer, the court admitted
evidence of the defendant's five years of prior drug dealings "to show a common scheme
or plan [on defendant's part] to engage in drug peddling." 429 N.E.2d at 955. The court,
however, gave no explanation of how this was relevant to a contested issue. It is well settled
that evidence of other crimes is not admissible merely to show the defendant's tendency
to commit certain types of crimes, Manuel, 267 Ind. at 438, 370 N.E.2d at 905-06 (and
cases cited therein), yet allowing prior drug crimes to show the defendant to be a drug
dealer seems to do no more than show his tendency to commit drug offenses. One commen-
tator has suggested that common scheme or plan evidence may always be used to show
that the crime charged is part of a larger scheme, Karlson, supra note I t, at 198, but does
not explain what relevancy such evidence has. Proving that the defendant has a lengthy
criminal history can only confuse the issues, increase the juror's willingness to convict the
defendant for past actions, and allow the prosecution to bootstrap a weak case. Occasional
cases like Downer, in which the legitimate evidence against the defendant was strong, and
the issue of the materiality of prior crimes was not discussed, probably should be viewed
as harmless error cases, and not read as a judicial blank check to allow the State to prove
the defendant's tendency to commit certain crimes. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10,
§ 190, at 448-49. See supra text accompanying note 3.
"1438 N.E.2d 722 (Ind. 1982).
"Id. at 726.
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held that opinions stated only in terms of probabilities and even possibilities
have some probative value and are admissible, but the court could not
decide what minimum standard to establish. The case is unusual because
the court split two to two on the issue, with one justice not participating.77
In both opinions, however, the justices agreed that prior case law requir-
ing medical testimony to be phrased in terms of reasonable medical cer-
tainty should be overruled. Thus the case clearly abrogates the reasonable-
medical-certainty standard, but fails to replace it with anything because
of the absence of a majority. Justice Hunter, who wrote the opinion for
the court stated: "We here reject the notion that the admissibility and
probative value of medical testimony is dependent upon the expert witness's
ability to state conclusions in terms of reasonable medical certainty; lack-
ing a clear majority here, our specific language in Palace Bar to the con-
trary should nonetheless be overruled." 78
In the 1978 case of Palace Bar v. Fearnot,9 the plaintiff sued for
the wrongful death of her husband who had fallen down stairs at the
Palace Bar. On the question of causation, however, the coroner and ex-
pert pathologist both testified that the decedent died of natural causes,
and not as a result of the fall.8" The pathologist did testify that it was
possible the decedent died of a heart attack, and possible for a heart attack
to be triggered by a fall, but he cautioned that there would be no way
to prove it. Despite the absence of testimony establishing causation, a
verdict was entered for the plaintiff.
The supreme court reversed, pointing out that the plaintiff had the
burden of proof on proximate cause, and that there was a total absence
of evidence on that issue. The only evidence on the subject showed that
the decedent died of natural causes. In referring to the pathologist's
speculation about the possiblity of a trauma-induced heart attack, a
unanimous court held:
A doctor's testimony can only be considered evidence when he
states that the conclusion he gives is based on reasonable medical
certainty that a fact is true or untrue. A doctor's testimony that
a certain thing is possible is no evidence at all. His opinion as
to what is possible is no more valid than the jury's own specula-
tion . . . .81
From the nature of the case, it is clear the court was not attempting
to define a general standard for the admissibility of expert opinions.
"Justice Hunter, joined by Justice Prentice, wrote the opinion of the court. Justice
Pivarnik wrote a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice Givan. Justice DeBruler did
not participate.
11438 N.E.2d at 726.
"9269 Ind. 405, 381 N.E.2d 858 (1978).
"°The coroner stated the cause of death was a cerebral hemorrhage, and the pathologist
found the decedent died as a result of heart disease. Id. at 407, 381 N.E.2d at 860.
"'Id. at 415, 381 N.E.2d at 864.
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Rather, it was making the point that when an expert testifies that in his
opinion a result was caused by one thing, and also testifies that a second
cause is possible but not likely, his testimony will not support a verdict
based on that second cause. The statement about reasonable medical cer-
tainty, then, probably was not intended to be taken literally or as a general
standard.
In Noblesville Casting, the medical expert similarly testified in terms
of possibilities rather than medical certainty. However, the testimony was
much stronger than that given in Palace Bar. When questioned about
causation, plaintiff's medical expert stated that the aggravation of a pre-
exiting injury could have been caused by external trauma and that it was
possible to reinjure one's back in the manner plaintiff claimed,82 language
similar to that used by the expert in Palace Bar. There was, however an
important difference in the testimony: in Palace Bar, the expert clearly
stated that another cause was more likely, but in Noblesville Casting, the
"possible" cause was itself the most likely. All four justices agreed that
this testimony was properly admitted even though not phrased in terms
of reasonable medical certainity,83 thus rejecting the strict semantic ap-
proach implied by the language in Palace Bar.
The two opinions in Noblesville Casting diverge on the question of
how to define the relevancy standard for expert testimony. Justice Hunter
would eschew a precise standard and decide on a case-by-case basis whether
the expert's testimony had probative value."4 Hunter would let the expert
testify as he sees fit because questioning and cross-examination about the
degree of certainty will give the jury enough information to accept or
reject the expert's opinion.85 This approach clearly would allow experts
to discuss possibilities as well as probable and certain results.
Justice Pivarnik concurred in the result because he disagreed with
Hunter's view concerning the value of expert testimony based only on
"possibilities." 8 Pivarnik would require that opinions be based at least
on probabilities; mere possibilities are too speculative to have probative
value.87 Justice Pivarnik found that:
S2438 N.E.2d at 726.
"Compare supra text accompanying note 78 with 438 N.E.2d at 738 (Pivarnik, J.,
concurring).
"Id. at 731.
"Justice Hunter stated that:
ITlo hinge the question whether an expert's opinion is admissible and probative
on the willingness ... to say that such-and-such is "reasonably certain," as opposed
to "probable" or "possible," is to impose on the expert a question which elevates
the law's demand for certainty in language over the state of the particular art
Id. at 727. As Justice Hunter's numerous citations indicate, this approach is followed in
many other jurisdictions and represents the modern trend. See id. at 727-29, and cases cited
therein.
"6438 N.E.2d at 737 (Pivarnik, J., concurring).
"Id. at 737-38.
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[Elvidence which speaks only to possibilities [cannot] be admissi-
ble as probative evidence, regardless of the status of the witness
giving it . . . It is impossible for every expert witness to testify
with certainty that a given scientific fact or result is apparent.
But by applying his experience in the field and the analytical proc-
esses to which he testifies, his certainty must be of such a degree
that it is more than a bare possibility."8
An analysis of the two opinions lead to the conclusion that the distinc-
tion between them is more semantic than real. Justice Hunter's opinion
concedes that an expert's opinion based on mere possibilities-an opinion
that lacks reasonable certainty or probability-is not sufficient evidence
to support a verdict, although it is admissible as having some probative
value.8 9 The concurrence was primarily concerned with the issue of what
kind of testimony will support a verdict. The concurring justices probably
would have to admit that once one expert testifies that a particular con-
clusion is probable, a rebuttal expert could be called to testify that the
state of the art refutes such a statement and that a series of conclusions
are equally possible. In fact, the concurrence approves the testimony
actually given in Noblesville Casting, which consisted of the expert's
testimony about possibilities.90 Thus, it is likely that testimony as to
possibilities is relevant once there is a legitimate issue about whether one
of the possibilities is more likely than the others.9 ' The plaintiff, however,
must offer some evidence that a particular result is the most probable
to sustain a verdict.
E. Previously Hypnotized Witnesses
Whether to allow the testimony of a witness who was hypnotized
before trial is an issue currently being debated in many jurisdictions.92
Witnesses are often able to remember extraordinary details about crimes
when under hypnosis, and police departments are increasingly resorting
to this technique as an investigative tool. Medical authorities, however,
caution that there is a dangerous potential for abuse when hypnotically
enhanced memory is used as the basis for courtroom testimony. Hyp-
notically recalled testimony can be a mixture of fact and fantasy based
"Id.
"Id. at 731.
"Id. at 738 (Pivarnik, J., concurring).
"See Jones v. State, 425 N.E.2d 128 (Ind. 1981) (court approved testimony based
on neutron activation analysis evidence that bullet "could have come" from certain box
of ammunition); Herman v. Ferrell, 150 Ind. App. 384, 276 N.E.2d 858 (1971) (speculative
medical testimony admissible); Magazine v. Shull, 116 Ind. App. 79, 60 N.E.2d 611
(1945) (medical experts may use words like "might," "could," and "possible").
"See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 93-96. For a further discussion of the use of hyp-
notized witnesses, see Johnson, Criminal Law and Procedure, 1983 Survey of Recent
Developments in Indiana Law, 17 IND. L. REv. 115, 167 (1984).
[Vol. 17:197
SURVEY-EVIDENCE
on suggestive words or cues used by the hypnotist, and neither the expert
nor the subject may be able to distinguish between them. A person under
hypnosis may unconsciously create answers if he or she cannot recall the
details being sought, a process called "confabulation." A hypnotized in-
dividual not only is easily influenced, but also is highly motivated to please
the hypnotist. Most importantly, once a person has awakened from a hyp-
notic trance, he or she usually will be confident that everything in his
or her memory-both fact and hypnotically induced fantasy-is factually
based, and this conviction cannot be undermined through cross-
examination. 3
Courts faced with an objection to the testimony of a previously hyp-
notized witness must undertake a difficult balancing of the legitimate in-
vestigative needs of the police against the danger of inaccurate trial
testimony resulting from suggestion. Although no consensus has yet been
reached, the majority of jurisdictions either prohibit hypnotically induced
testimony altogether,9" or allow it only if certain safeguards against un-
due suggestion are followed.95 A few courts have held that hypnotically
refreshed testimony is always admissible, and that its inherent problems
and the possibility of suggestion go to the weight and credibility, not to
the admissibility of the testimony.96
During the survey period, the Indiana Supreme Court decided five
cases concerning the testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses. Con-
sidered together, these cases establish fairly clear guidelines for the ad-
missibility of testimony influenced by hypnosis. Indiana, for the most part,
has taken the minority position that such testimony is admissible, and
that the possibility that the witness' memory has been altered by sug-
gestive procedures goes only to its weight. There is one clear exception:
any evidence derived for the first time during a hypnotic session is per
se inadmissible.
The first hypnosis case, Strong v. State,97 concerned the admissibility
of identification evidence. An eyewitness to a robbery-murder was hyp-
"See Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468, 471-72 (Ind. 1982). See generally D. CHEEK
& L. LECRON, CLINICAL HYPNOTHERAPY 13 (1968); Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use
of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 313 (1980); Levitt, The
Use of Hypnosis to "Freshen" the Memory of Witnesses or Victims, 17 TRIAL 56 (Apr.
1981); Note, Hypnotically Induced Testimony: Credibility versus Admissibility, 57 IND. L.J.
349 (1982).
"See Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468, 472 (Ind. 1982), and cases cited therein.
"The leading case is State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981), in which the
court required the following safeguards suggested by experts in hypnosis: (I) that the ses-
sion be conducted by an impartial, experienced psychiatrist or psychologist, not regularly
employed by the police; (2) that the witness give a detailed narrative statement before being
hypnotized; (3) that the entire session be recorded; and (4) that no police be present during
the session. See also Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468, 472 (Ind. 1982), and cases cited
therein.
"See Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468, 472 (Ind. 1982), and cases cited therein.
"435 N.E.2d 969 (Ind. 1982). Before Strong, the supreme court had heard only two
cases involving previously hypnotized witnesses. In both, the defendant had waived any
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notized by a police officer, and a composite drawing of the killer was
made from the description the witness gave while in a hynotic trance.
The drawing was admitted at trial, and the defendant appealed. The court
adopted the majority position, holding that evidence obtained for the first
time from a witness while he or she is in a hypnotic trance "is inherently
unreliable and should, therefore be excluded as having no probative
value." 98 The court also noted that evidence produced during a hynotic
trance "is not susceptible of cross-examination and should be excluded
for this reason alone." 99
The defendant also objected to the witness's in-court identification
on the grounds that the hypnosis was impermissibly suggestive. The court
did not look at hypnosis cases from other jurisdictions, but rather, followed
the reasoning in suggestive line-up cases, requiring only that the State show
by "clear and convincing evidence, that the in-court identification of the
defendant has a factual basis independent of the hypnotic session."'," In
upholding the admissibility of the in-court identification despite the police-
conducted hypnosis, the court impliedly rejected the majority positions
that hypnotically influenced testimony is either per se inadmissible, or in-
admissible unless carefully safeguarded against police influence. Without
even mentioning the possibility of requiring safeguards, the court found
that because the witness had a good opportunity to view the killer and
had picked his photograph out of a mug book before being hypnotized,
there was a sufficient factual basis, independent of the hypnotic session,
for the in-court identification. The court held that any possible changes
in the witness' testimony caused by suggestive hypnosis "are matters which
go to the weight to be given her testimony and not to its admissibility.''.
Four months later, the supreme court decided the second hypnosis
case, Forrester v. State.'2 This time, the testimony objected to concerned
the corpus delicti of the crime rather than the identification of the accused.
In Forrester, the victim of a rape had been hypnotized before trial.'0 3
The defendant objected claiming that the victim was therefore incompe-
tent to testify at all. The supreme court rejected this argument, holding
that the victim was competent to testify "with respect to necessary and
relevant evidence of the corpus delicti of the charged offenses, which
claim of error by failing to object. Pavone v. State, 402 N.E.2d 976 (Ind. 1980); Merrifield
v. State, 400 N.E.2d 146 (Ind. 1980).
"1435 N.E.2d at 970 (citations omitted). The court cited thirteen cases from ten jurisdic-
tions in support of this position. Id.
991d.
"'Id. at 970-71 (citations omitted). The court cited Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S.
98 (1977) and Morgan v. State, 400 N.E.2d III (Ind. 1980) for the due process requirements
for in-court identifications.
'O1435 N.E.2d at 971 (citing Willis v. State, 411 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)).
02440 N.E.2d 475 (Ind. 1982).
"'The opinion does not state whether she was hypnotized by the police, as in Strong,
or by an independent expert as required in the safeguards discussed in note 95, supro.
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evidence the prosecutrix had already provided to the police before the
hypnotic session." ' 0° The victim was therefore properly allowed to relate
the incident during her testimony. The court's opinion suggests that it
might not have permitted the victim to identify the accused in court because
the identification might have been solely the product of the hypnotic ses-
sion; however, the court did not decide this issue because the defendant
did not raise it. Thus, Forrester reaffirms two principles stated in Strong:
evidence derived from a hypnotic session will be excluded, but hypnotically
influenced testimony will be admitted if consistent with statements the
witness made before being hypnotized. Forrester also implies that hyp-
notically influenced testimony concerning the elements of the offense may
be more readily allowed than hypnotically influenced identification
testimony.
Pearson v. State,' 5 the third hypnosis case, was decided one month
after Forrester. This case presents the supreme court's most thorough treat-
ment of the issue. In Pearson, a rape victim was hypnotized by a police
officer after she had given a statement, but before trial. The trial court
overruled the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress the victim's entire
testimony because her memory had been contaminated and altered by the
hypnosis. The supreme court for the first time reviewed at length the
dangers of hypnosis and the cases from other jurisdictions excluding hyp-
notically influenced testimony or requiring stringent safeguards. Never-
theless, relying on Strong and Forrester, the court explicity rejected the
majority position, holding that the fact of hypnosis "should be a matter
of weight with the trier of fact but not a per se disqualification of the
witness.''"0 6
The court in Pearson does appear to create one foundation require-
ment for the admission of hypnotically influenced testimony-the witness
may only testify concerning matters about which he or she made pre-
hypnosis statements."0 Otherwise, the offeror will not be able to comply
with the court's requirement that:
In every case the trier of fact must be presented with sufficient
evidence to be able to judge the reliability of the witness's percep-
tion of the events before the hypnosis session, the manner in which
the hypnosis procedure was conducted, and the degree to which
the witness's statements were changed by the hypnosis session. '
'0440 N.E.2d at 481.
'441 N.E.2d 468 (Ind. 1982).
' 
6 d. at 473. The court suggested that "the careful attorney" will want to follow the
safeguards mentioned in note 95, supra, but did not require these safeguards as foundation
elements. 441 N.E.2d at 473. The court also stated that no special instruction on evaluating
the credibility of a hypnotized witness may be given. "[lI]t is erroneous to give an instruc-
tion which singles out one witness's testimony and attacks its credibility." Id. at 475.
"'1441 N.E.2d at 473.
Id. (emphasis added).
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In Pearson, the victim had positively identified the defendant as her
assailant and described the corpus delicti of the offense before being hyp-
notized. She was then hypnotized in what the court admitted was a "very
unreliable" session.' 9 Nevertheless, the court explicitly held that she was
a competent witness both as to the identification of the accused and as
to the necessary elements of the corpus delicti. This holding impliedly
rejects any notion that identification testimony might be treated differently
than corpus delicti testimony.
In Stewart v. State,"II the final hypnosis case, a witness made a state-
ment about a shooting after he was hypnotized by a police officer. The
witness testified that he remembered nothing new about the crime after
the session.''' The supreme court rejected a challenge that the witness
was incompetent to testify at all because of the hypnosis. The issue was
given little attention because the defendant had waived it.' 2 Nevertheless,
the court stated in dictum that a witness can testify after hypnosis about
the corpus delicti of a crime if he provided such information before the
hypnotic session.' 3 The opinion refers back to the tantalizing suggestion
in Forrester that hypnotically refreshed testimony about the elements of
the crime may be treated differently than hypnotically aided identifica-
tion testimony."'
Peterson v. State"' is the most recent Indiana Supreme Court deci-
sion concerning hypnosis. In Peterson, a witness to a murder related the
incident to the police, but was not able to identify the perpetrators from
a photo-array or line-up. The witness was subsequently hypnotized by a
police officer in an effort to enhance his memory. After the hypnotic
session, the witness identified a photograph of the defendant as the
murderer. Over the defendant's strenuous objections,' 6 the witness testified
in court about the details of the murder and made an in-court identifica-
tion of the defendant. The defendant was found guilty of murder and
appealed.
'd. Apparently, none of the safeguards suggested in note 95, supra, were present.
"0442 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. 1982).
'"It is astounding that the supreme court could place any reliance on the witness'
own statement that he remembered nothing new, when the court had itself noted only one
month before that "[ilt is usually impossible for ... the subject . . .. to distinguish between
the fact and fantasy even when the subject is brought out of the hypnotic trance." Pearson
v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468, 471 (Ind. 1982).
'
2The defendant failed to raise the issue of the witness' competency to testify in his
Belated Motion to Correct Errors. 442 N.E.2d at 1031.
'"Id. (citing Forrester v. State, 440 N.E.2d 475 (Ind. 1982)).
'4442 N.E.2d at 1031. It is unlikely that the two kinds of testimony will in fact be
treated differently. The court, in Pearson, the only case presenting a proper objection and
both kinds of testimony, treated them the same.
"448 N.E.2d 673 (Ind. 1983).
'"The defendant's motion to suppress, motion in limine, and objection at trial were
all overruled by the trial court. Id. at 674.
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The supreme court reversed the defendant's conviction in an opinion
that explored the merits and dangers of hypnosis at some length. ' " The
court found that the witness' testimony about the facts of the crime was
properly admitted but that the admission of his in-court identification of
the defendant was reversible error.' 8 The difference in treatment, however,
was not based upon a distinction between hypnotically aided testimony
about the corpus delicti of the crime and hypnotically aided identification
testimony. Rather, the distinction was made because "there was an in-
dependent factual basis for [the witness'] general testimony with respect
to the occurrence of [the] murder"'' 9 but the in-court identification was
"the direct [result] of a hypnotic session.'""' Furthermore, the hypnotically
aided in-court identification did not allow the defendant "to exercise his
due process rights to confront and cross-examine. '
Justice Hunter wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he made
an effort to clarify the supreme court's position on hypnotically aided
testimony.'22 He stated that the Indiana position falls in between the "total
exclusion" rule and the jurisdictions that allow all hypnotically aided
testimony with the associated problems going to the weight of the
evidence. 2
Thus, the Indiana Supreme Court acknowledges the likelihood of con-
fabulation, yet refuses to adopt realistic safeguards to protect the defend-
ant. Experts stress that a reliable session can be conducted only by an
impartial hypnotist with no police present,'" yet Indiana will allow police
"The majority opinion, however, only discussed one Indiana hypnosis case, Strong
v. State, 435 N.E.2d 969 (Ind. 1982).
'1448 N.E.2d at 678-79.
1"1d. at 678.
"'Id. at 675. The court compared the in-court identification to the composite drawing
in Strong.
1'Id. at 678. The court also discussed with apparent approval the defendant's argu-
ment. that "hypnosis has not gained such general acceptance in the scientific community
so as to constitute a reliable and legally valid procedure for enhancing memory." Id. at 674.
"'Id. at 679 (Hunter, J., concurring).
1'1d. (citations omitted). Justice Hunter delineated the court's position on the use of
hypnotically aided testimony as:
(1) the witness is not totally incompetent to testify and there will be no error
when the witness testifies to what was remembered before the hypnosis; (2) any
evidence derived from a witness while he or she is under hypnosis is inherently
unreliable and must be excluded as having no probative value; (3) if evidence
that is the product of a hypnosis session is admitted during trial, it will not be
reversible error if the jury is aware of all the circumstances surrounding the hyp-
nosis session and the degree to which the witness's statements were changed by
the hypnosis, and if the changes in the witness's statements were not significant
or did not relate to essential elements of the offense.
Id.
"2'See' State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 264, 271 (Minn. 1980).
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officers to hynotize a key witness.' 25 Experts point out that the hypnotized
subject will be unaware that his or her memory has been changed by sug-
gestion, making cross-examination to expose alterations impossible, ,26 yet
Indiana will not require that the state make a record of what the subject
was told during hypnosis. In short, the supreme court has required only
one of the safeguards that experts think necessary: the subject must have
given a prior statement on the facts before being hypnotized. The only
hypnotically influenced testimony that will be excluded is information on
a matter brought up for the first time during a hypnotic trance. New
details about an issue previously mentioned are admissible; only a totally
new topic will be excluded. This absence of safeguards, when taken in
conjunction with the court's refusal to permit a special cautionary instruc-
tion regarding hypnotically influenced testimony,'27 may lead to the con-
viction of some defendants on the basis of false evidence that is the product
of advertent or inadvertent suggestion implanted during hypnosis.
F. Breathalyzer Tests
In order for the results of a breathalyzer test to be admissible, the
state must prove three foundation elements:
1. The test was administered by an operator certified by the
department of toxicology [of the Indiana University School
of Medicine];
2. The equipment used in the test was inspected and approved
by the department of toxicology; and
3. The operator used techniques approved by the department of
toxicology.' 28
In Boothe v. State,'29 the fourth district court of appeals interpreted
the third foundation element as requiring the State to introduce a cer-
tified copy of the department of toxicology's approved procedures for
conducting a breathalyzer test. In Boothe, the evidence at trial concern-
ing the techniques used by the operator consisted of the following:
Mr. Morrison: Officer Haverstock, is the routine procedure that
you use in administering the test the same ones that were given you
"'See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 442 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (Ind. 1982); Pearson v. State,
441 N.E.2d 468, 470 (Ind. 1982).
126441 N.E.2d at 471.
'"Id. at 475 (no special instruction singling out the credibility of one witness may
be given).
"'Klebs v. State, 159 Ind. App. 180, 183, 305 N.E.2d 781, 783 (1974).
29439 N.E.2d 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
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by the Department of Toxicology in their instructions . . .?
Officer Haverstock: Yes, those were the procedures that I
followed. ,30
The court held that the operator's conclusion that he followed approved
procedures was not sufficient to satisfy this part of the foundation. In-
stead, the court required the State to first prove what the approved tech-
niques are through introduction of a certified official document from the
department of toxicology, and then prove that the operator complied with
them. ' II
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied primarily on two earlier
decisions which held that breathalyzer tests were inadmissible because of
inadequate proof on this foundation element. In one, the operator
described his own procedures, but "the record [was] devoid of any evidence
to establish that the procedure described resembled the procedure approved
by the department of toxicology.""'3 In the other, the State showed a
videotape depicting the operation of the test and the operator's tech-
niques, but again "the record [was] devoid of any evidence establishing
that the procedure utilized resembled the procedure approved by the
Department."' 33 Neither operator testified that he followed approved pro-
cedures. In neither case did the court indicate how the State must prove
what the department of toxicology approved procedures are, nor did either
opinion imply that the operator's testimony that he followed approved
procedures would be insufficient. There is a significant difference between
requiring some evidence and requiring a certified copy of the department
document. Nevertheless, the opinion in Boothe demands that the State
offer a certified copy of the document. An important question raised by
the Boothe decision is whether other methods of establishing correct pro-
cedures, such as the operator's own testimony, calling an expert witness
from the department of toxicology, or asking for judicial notice, are
precluded.
Presumably, the Boothe holding means that the other two parts of
the breathalyzer foundation also require the introduction of copies of the
appropriate department of toxicology documents. The State will have to
prove that the operator was certified through a copy of that certificate,
and that the equipment was inspected and approved by copies of those
"I1d. at 711. Apparently, there are two department documents-one detailed and one
a summary checklist. In Denman v. State, 432 N.E.2d 426, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), the
court found that either could be used, although it is not clear whether this is still good
law after Boothe.
"'The document would be admissible as an official record of the State under Trial
Rule 44, see J. TANFORD & R. QUINLAN, supra note 22, § 25.3, at 119-21, and under IND.
CODE § 9-11-4-5(c) (Supp. 1983) (certified copies of such document are admissible and con-
stitute prima facie evidence of the approved technique).
"Klebs v. State, 159 Ind. App. 180, 184, 305 N.E.2d 781, 784 (1974) (emphasis added).
"'Hartman v. State, 401 N.E.2d 723, 725 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (emphasis added).
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documents.' 3 Boothe does not address these other foundation elements
explicitly, and no previous case has made the introduction of department
documents absolutely essential; however, the conclusion seems logically
compelled. The controlling statute explicitly prohibits the admission of
breathalyzer test results unless the test was performed by a certified
operator with certified equipment and chemicals.' 35 The statute makes no
mention of exclusion for failure to follow approved procedures. If a strict
foundation requirement is attached to an only implicit requirement, surely
the explicit requirements will be no less strictly enforced.
Taken in toto, these requirements make the introduction of
breathalyzer results curiously different from the introduction of the results
of other kinds of scientific tests. The results of scientific tests generally
will be admissible if the operator's own testimony establishes his or her
training and competency.' 6 Yet the implications of Boothe are that a
breathalyzer operator may not simply testify to being certified, but must
produce the certificate. The requirements that scientific machines be work-
ing properly and that proper procedures were followed can be established
in the usual case by the operator's testimony, because he or she is the
expert.' 37 Boothe holds to the contrary for breathalyzer tests. A partial,
if not a satisfactory, explanation for treating breathalyzer tests differently
can be found in the Indiana Code which explicitly states that breathalyzer
results are not admissible unless the operator and equipment were
certified,' 38 and in state administrative regulations that provide that the
departmentally approved method "shall be followed." '39 There are no
similar provisions for other kinds of scientific tests.
" Cf Denman v. State, 432 N.E.2d 426 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). In Denman, the State of-
fered into evidence the certification document for the equipment and chemicals, and the
court admitted them over the defendant's hearsay objection pursuant to IND. CODE §
9-4-4.5-6(b) (1982) ("The certificate . . . is admissible as evidence"). That code section
has been replaced by a new act to the same effect. Act of Apr. 19, 1983, Pub. L. No.
143-1983, § 1, 1983 Ind. Acts 989, 993 (codified at IND. CODE § 9-11-4-5(c) (Supp. 1983)).
.. IND. CODE § 9-11-4-5(d) (Supp. 1983).
"'A physician need not introduce a certified copy of his or her medical license to
be qualified as an expert, but may testify that he or she is licensed.
"'See Reid v. State, 267 Ind. 555, 375 N.E.2d 1149 (1978) (involving trace metal
detection).
."IND. CODE § 9-11-4-5(a), (d) (Supp. 1983).
"260 IND. ADMIN. CODE § 1-3-1(2) (1979).
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